How to think about Iran

July 8, 2019

People simplify countries into good and bad, leading us to bluster about military options, and overlook better ways to get things done.

It seems required that all discussions of Iran begin with statements about lack of trust and the badness of what they are doing. But goodness and badness aren’t genes baked into each country’s DNA. Despite American complaints about Iranian government, Iran waited a year after this country reneged on the multi-national nuclear agreement before acting in conflict with its no-longer application terms. They were not, in this case, untrustworthy.

Much of the Iranian population is very westernized. Despite some of the leadership’s language, Iran is not a country of America haters, or nearly as authoritarian as much of the Middle East. Iranians have been voting for decades except when our country dislodged their democratically selected leader and substituted the Shah. Iranians don’t have as much power as they want but they have a great deal more than most of the people of the region. Until the current occupant of the White House took over, they pushed their leadership in our direction.

We’d benefit from thinking about the Middle East and Iran differently. Iraq and Iran fought a war that cost at least half a million lives, with two or three times that many casualties. American defeat of Iraq removed any Iraqi threat to Iran and made Iran more powerful, which many here regret.

But also, Israel and Iran were cooperating before the U.S.-Iraq wars. The enemy of my enemy is my friend and Iraq was their common enemy. So after we defeated Iraq, Iran and Israel saw each other as the most dangerous countries in the region, leaving Iran facing Israel and Saudi Arabia in the new Middle East.

Saudis aren’t angels. They’re decades behind Iran in their treatment of women and have caused us much more trouble. Saudi support for militant Wahhabi Islam brought 9/11 about, produced Osama bin Ladan, al Qaeda and led to the war in Afghanistan, and Saudi Wahhabi schools are radicalizing the Islamic world. Our alliance with Saudi Arabia has been very costly.

So assuming we suffer the pain and cost of defeating Iran, which countries would drive the new Middle East: Israel, Saudi Arabia or Turkey? The longstanding working relationships between Iran and Turkey have helped stabilize both. Turkey is now playing East and West against each other. It seeks entry into the EU while becoming increasingly authoritarian. If Iran were defeated, would Turkey draw closer to the west, to Sunni Islamic countries or would Turkey be more vulnerable to the Russian bear? The answer isn’t obvious. A defeated Iran would be in chaos, and the risks that could pose to all countries in the area as well as ourselves could be very severe. In other words, war is not an independent decision without understanding or controlling the aftermath.

Defeating Iran may only solidify our reputation as the world’s most warlike country. Plus, demonizing Iran is diverting us from China’s threat to the security of other countries in the Far East. If those countries lose confidence in American support, the world balance of power could change in an instant. How to make America puny again.

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Bill Beeman, Is Iran the World’s greatest State Sponsor of Terror?

September 24, 2018

Is Iran the World’s greatest State Sponsor of Terror?
Bill Beeman: Iran’s Support of terrorism is less than it seems

This article was originally published in the San Diego Tribune in 2005,
updated by Bill Beeman for publication in the Peace Corps Iran Association Advocacy Bulletin, https://peacecorpsiran.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-09-ADVOCACY-BULLETIN.pdf, and reprinted here with permission from Bill Beeman and the Advocacy Bulletin. Bill’s analysis remains true today:

Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned, is the charge that Iran “is the (world’s) most active state sponsor of terrorism,” to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its nuclear program, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.

The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations grew more strident from year to year. On an annual basis, the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.

This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran’s continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials – including former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
United Nations Ambassador, Nikki Haley and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 9/23/2018 Gmail – September 2018 Peace Corps Iran Advocacy Bulletin https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=eb7a16298a&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f%3A1612370308135412433%7Cmsg-f%3A161237030813… 6/11 “Iran supports Hezbollah” is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shiite Lebanese group. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Hezbollah is arguably no longer a terrorist organization, as it could be said to have been 25 years ago.

Iran had an undeniable interest in the fate of the large Shiite community in southern Lebanon following the Revolution of 1978-79. The Lebanese Shiites were under oppression from both Sunnis and Maronite Christians. Moreover, Sunni Palestinian refugees, settled in their midst, both served as a drain on weak local economic resources, and, because of their attacks on Israel, as magnets for violent Israeli retaliation in the region. The Shiites, who were attacked as much as the Palestinians, felt helpless and frustrated, and eventually fought back by forming Hezbollah.

The successful revolution in Iran was enormously inspirational to these Lebanese Shiites, and many Iranians, zealous and excited at their victory over the Pahlavi regime, were looking for ways to spread their revolution. Under these conditions, support for Hezbollah seemed to be virtuous aid for a hapless community of coreligionists under oppression, just as the Iranians had felt themselves to be before the Revolution.

The Iranian central government was weak and scattered after the Revolution. Semi-independent charitable organizations, called bonyads (literally, “foundations”) sponsored by individual Shiite clerics began to help the fledgling Hezbollah organization get off the ground. There was little the Khomeini government could do to curtail these operations without endangering public support for the fledgling Republic, since internal power struggles were endemic.

Syria also had a strong role in the early establishment and sustenance of Hezbollah, and its role was far more practical and self-serving that Iran’s. Indeed, Iranian ideologues could never have had entered to southern Lebanon without Syria’s cooperation.

Now, after nearly two decades, the export of Iranian revolutionary ideology in this loose and uncontrolled manner may have succeeded too well. Hezbollah maintains a stronger commitment to the symbolic legacy of the Iranian Revolution than Iranians themselves. According to Hezbollah expert Daniel Byman, writing recently in Foreign Affairs, ” … (Iran) lacks the means to force a significant change in the (Hezbollah)
movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah’s leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran’s leadership.”

In short, although Iranian religionists were instrumental in aiding its establishment, Hezbollah has now taken on a life of its own. Even if all Iranian financial and logistic support were cut off, Hezbollah would not only continue, it would thrive. Put simply, Iran’s support is not essential for Hezbollah to continue. Byman flatly states that if the United States is really serious about stopping Hezbollah, it would do better to attack
Syria than Iran.

Hezbollah has achieved stability and respectability by becoming as much a social welfare and political organization as a militant resistance organization. According to international relations specialist Dwight J. Simpson, in 2004 it had 12 elected parliamentary members. Moreover many Hezbollah members hold elected positions within local governments. The group had by that time built five hospitals and is building more. It operated 25 primarily secular schools, and provided subsidies to shopkeepers. Its support came primarily from zakat – the charitable “tithe” required of all Muslims – not from Iran.

The Shiites, having seen their co-religionists in Iraq succeed in initial elections there in 2005 have hopes that they too will assume the power in Lebanon that accords with their status as the nation’s largest community. As this happens, Hezbollah will fully cease to be a terrorist group and will gradually assume the role of a political organization. Its “terrorist” activities will be reframed as national defense, especially as they gain control of conventional military forces and weapons.

It should be clear to Americans that the Bush administration is stymied in its dealings with Tehran. The prospect of a direct attack on the Iran to bring about “regime change” is not a practical possibility. In part because of specious accusations such as “the most active state supporter of terrorism” charge, Tehran’s leaders are all but deaf to American politicians. This standoff would begin to change if the United States
would abandon this baseless rhetoric.


IRAN, the Nuclear Agreement and Donald Trump

May 8, 2018

America sees itself as altruistic and believes we should be trusted because we proved it in World War II. But, in 1953, Americans in the Embassy in Tehran helped engineer a coup d’état against the democratically selected Prime Minister of Iran. Persians admired us for our power but hated what we had done.

Americans did not understand that history when, during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Persians stormed the Embassy and made hostages of the staff. That breached international law and was very hurtful for those involved but it was brought on by the memory that the earlier coup was managed from the Embassy. Now we both had reason to hate each other.

But the subsequent history is more interesting than the popular stereotypes. Diplomatic relations and even cooperation between Iran and Israel as well as major trade ( including Iran supplying oil in exchange for Israeli weapons and ballistic missile technology) lasted long after the Islamic Revolution and persisted despite Ahmadinejad’s hateful rhetoric. America and Iran continued cooperating about many Middle Eastern issues despite the effort of a succession of American presidents to isolate Iran.

Isolation threatened Iran. The religious division of the Middle East between the Shia, principally in Iran, and the Sunni, dominant everywhere else, provide opportunities for politicians to whip up animosities when it suits their purposes – much as Trump has whipped up animosities over racial differences and guns to dangerous levels. To stay on good terms with most of its neighbors, Iran supported Sunni positions on Palestine.

America stood back while Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war in the 1980s but then defeated Iraq under Presidents George H.W. and George W. Bush. Since Iraq had been Iran’s major antagonist, its defeat at the hands of the U.S. was a great gift to Iran and destabilized the power relations in the Middle East. Meanwhile Iran continued seeking rapprochement with the U.S. and offered to be helpful to the U.S. in our conflicts in the area, but no president was willing to talk until Obama. Obama had larger goals, to get Middle Eastern disputes out of the way while addressing problems in Asia.

Trump’s current effort to scuttle the multi-power agreement with Iran plays out stereotypes while sending terrible signals with ominous consequences:

  • Since US intelligence and military leaders and every involved head of state except the current U.S. President thinks Iran obeyed the terms of the agreement, what could count as obedience?
  • If obedience to the terms of the agreement doesn’t count, why should any country reach agreements with the U.S.?
  • If the U.S. terminates agreements at will, what is the value of diplomacy?
  • If the U.S. rides roughshod over non-nuclear countries, then nations need a nuclear capacity to hold us off.
  • And if diplomacy with the U.S. is a sterile enterprise, is war better? The origin of the Joint Agreement was European concern over the possibility of yet another war in the Middle East. Are we back to that?

Iran has become an American boogey-man, and too many think we look weak if we even talk with them. Israel’s concern has been to avoid letting any other country play a significant role in American thinking about the Middle East. That’s a recipe for trouble. It substitutes pure power for diplomacy and respectful negotiation. In fact, Iran has been anything but a loose cannon and has shown both the capacity and the willingness to resolve conflicts among us, provided that Iran be consulted and treated respectfully regarding Middle Eastern events. Only in a respectful climate can Iran play the constructive role we claim to want.

But Donald Trump wants an enemy for the political benefits. Risking the lives and safety of American and other men, women and children so Trump can look tough is a cynical abuse of his office. And if it misfires, we’ll be counting more body bags and amputees.

— This commentary was broadcast on WAMC Northeast Report, May 8, 2018.


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